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AN EXPERIMENT ON THE ROLE OF
PENALTY CLAUSES AND THE LEVEL OF LEGAL
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT ON
THE PREVENTION OF THE HOLD-UP
PROBLEM IN COLOMBIAN CONTRACT LAW
Juan Antonio Gaviria-
This article analyzes the results of an experiment with Colom-
bian students testing the theories that penalty clauses and a high level
of legal remedies for breach of contract prevent the hold-up problem.
While the results of this experiment failed to statistically confirm the
predictions of the theory, they did not reject them. Furthermore, the re-
sults show that held-up parties were better off after the parties renegoti-
ated the contract when either a penalty clause was provided or the law
increased the level of legal remedies in comparison with a benchmark
scenario. On the other hand, the results are a contribution to the field of
empirical contract law and economics since the analysis presented here
might be replicated in similar experiments and, ultimately, lead to pro-
posals to efficiently address the hold-up problem.
INTRODUCTION
Hypothetically, the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of a com-
pany ("Buyco") calls his colleague at another company ("Selco") and
says: "Hi Jon, it's Fred, how are you doing? Jon, our contract is not
performing as well as we expected on our side, so we need to renegoti-
ate it. I hope you will understand this friendly request. By the way,
Jon, I am sorry to say that if your company does not accept our offer,
we will be forced to stop buying your steel."
Perhaps this story is not terribly surprising. It occurs every
day in the business world, and nobody refers to it as blackmail, extor-
tion, or foul play. Indeed, business people accept and encourage this
kind of behavior. There are cases, however, where this behavior is im-
permissible, such as when the original contract required Selco to make
a nine-figure dollar investment to manufacture and customize the
steel-a process that made this investment worthless for any company
other than Buyco. It might be surprising that Buyco's CEO coinciden-
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tally demands a modification just after Selco's investment sunk and
not before that, or at the negotiation of the original contract. It might
be even more surprising why Buyco is subtly threatening to breach the
contract if Selco does not accept the price change. Many people reading
these facts might logically conclude that Buyco's behavior is outra-
geous. Indeed, it is. Sadly, Buyco's behavior is also rational: Fred, its
CEO, is taking advantage of Selco's sunk investment to increase its
contractual surplus.
Selco's CEO (Jon) might consider telling Fred to stop buying its
steel as he threatened. Jon would consider that if Buyco follows
through on this threat, his company might find itself on the brink of
bankruptcy. Not only does the contract account for a great percentage
of its bottom line, but also, the ensuing litigation would be lengthy,
expensive, and uncertain. Thus, chances are that Jon, while outraged,
would accept the modification only to avoid a bigger evil: breach. In
such a case, Selco is held-up by Buyco.
This hypothetical scenario does not stop there. Jon tells some
of his friends, top executives at other companies, about the "extortion"
he suffered at the hands of Buyco. His colleagues' reactions are natu-
ral: after listening to Selco's predicament, they refrain from entering
into contracts requiring idiosyncratic investments in order to avoid be-
ing in a vulnerable position during the performance of these contracts.
They prefer, and no shareholder may criticize them for such decisions,
to make general and low-risk investments. They are also held-up, and
their refusal to make some investments is not good for companies or
the economy as a whole.
A hold-up, the situation arising in the example above, is a prob-
lem for many reasons. Most noticeably, hold-ups lead to inefficient in-
vestments, which in turn harm the macroeconomic fundamentals of a
country. Thus, if the hold-up problem is not well understood, or worse,
if the law does not adequately address it, many huge and strategic in-
vestments for the economic development of Colombia, or of any other
country, will never be made.
At least two other harmful effects of the hold-up problem de-
serve some explanation. First, because the parties deciding to make
idiosyncratic investments do so only after taking some precautions,
such as protective contract provisions, to avoid being extorted during
the performance stage of the contract, the hold-up problem leads to an
increase in transaction costs. Of course, these precautions are expen-
sive; hence, their technical name is transaction costs.2 Even worse,
2 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 373 (1996) (dis-
cussing how transaction costs are the expenses of negotiating, drafting, and moni-
toring the allocation of rights and duties resulting from any possible contingency
might be unaffordable).
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protective contract provisions are not always effective to address the
hold-up problem. Otherwise, these provisions would be used sparingly
to prevent the problem. For example, a penalty clause may prevent the
hold-up problem. However, a penalty clause has a cost-an increased
or reduced price for the potentially held-up party. Furthermore, if this
party is actually held-up, enforcing the penalty clause is not an easy
task.
Second, the hold-up problem reduces the reliability of con-
tracts: that is, the confidence that parties and the market as a whole
should have that contracts will usually be performed in accordance
with the provisions that were voluntarily agreed upon. Reliability in
contracts is reduced because the hold-up problem forces a one-sided
modification that one of the parties would not have accepted, but for
fear of losing an investment that is only valuable for the other party,
but not for any third-party. Needless to say, if contracts are not relia-
ble, the efficiency of markets is impaired and their failures are
worsened.3
This description is not intended to be a comprehensive exami-
nation of the hold-up problem. Such a goal is beyond the scope of this
article. Rather, it is just an introduction to this article's topic: an anal-
ysis of the role of both penalty clauses and a higher level of remedies
for breach of contract (in comparison with the current level) on the
prevention of the hold-up problem in contracts between private
merchants to manufacture and sell or supply goods.4 This analysis
provides at least two benefits. On the one hand, this article contributes
to the empirical contract law and economics literature,' especially in
Colombia where studies about empirical legal studies are almost inex-
istent. On the other hand, this experiment not only intends to test
some theories, but also to encourage further experiments with similar
purposes.6
3 See MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAP-
ITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 185 (2000) (providing the causality link between reliability
in contracts and well-performing markets).
4 Legal remedies, incidentally, mean those remedies that the law supplies in the
absence of valid contractually stated remedies (i.e., penalty clauses).
5 See Colin Camerer & Eric Talley, Experimental Study of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1621, 1621 (A. Mitchel Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007)
(describing the emergence of empirical approaches in the field of law and
economics).
6 See Richard K. Neumann, Jr. & Stefan H. Krieger, Empirical Inquiry Twenty-
Five Years After the Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 359 (2003) (stat-
ing that the value of an empirical analysis depends on the ability of other investi-
gators to replicate the research); see also Rachel Croson, Why and How to
Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
921, 922 (2002).
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For instance, the theory stating that penalty clauses prevent
the hold-up problem, might be tested in the United States ("U.S."),
where these kind of clauses are unenforceable. If the U.S. experiments
confirm the theory, the proposals contending that penalty clauses
should be enforceable might have empirical support, at least in rela-
tion to the hold-up problem. The theory that a high level of legal rem-
edy mitigates the hold-up problem might also be tested in the U.S., or
in any other country.
This article is structured as follows: Section I summarizes the
economic theory underlying the hold-up problem. Section II reviews
the literature on experiments testing theories related to the hold-up
problem. Section III describes the theories that this experiment tests.
Section IV describes the experimental design (i.e., the hypothetical
facts that the subjects participating in the experiment will analyze
before taking their decisions, the payments that they will receive, and
the predictions of the results). Section V summarizes the results of the
experiment. Finally, Section VI concludes.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
The hold-up problem occurs when a company refrains from en-
tering a contract and making a relationship-specific investment, 7 to
avoid the risk that the other party to the contract will extort a modifi-
cation for the exclusive benefit of the party who did not make the in-
vestment.' In this article, the victim of a hold-up is called the "held-up
7 See Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies,
and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECoN. REV. 478, 478 (1996) (discussing.relation-
ship-specific investments are those highly valuable for the parties while they are
performing the contract but whose value is significantly less or even zero for third
parties or for the parties themselves when the contract ends).
8 This is an original definition of the hold-up problem. See Daniel A. Graham &
Ellen R. Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-up
Game, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (1989); Abraham L. Wickelgren, The Limi-
tations of Buyer-Option Contracts in Solving the Holdup Problem, 23 J. LAw,
ECON. & ORG. 127, 127 (2007). On the other hand, a modification might be of two
kinds: (1) a surplus-maximizing modification or (2) a distributive modification. A
surplus-maximizing modification makes at least one of the parties better off, with-
out making anyone worse off. As a result, a surplus-maximizing modification is
Pareto efficient. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAw AND
ECONoMIcs 7 n.4 (3d ed. 2003) (providing a redistributive modification, in con-
trast, is not Pareto-efficient but a zero-sum result. Redistributive modifications
occur where a better bargain for one party entails a worse bargain for the other
party). The modifications that arise due to the hold-up problem are redistributive
modifications because, if the offer is accepted, then the contractual share of the
held-up party will be reduced while the share of the non-investing party will be
increased by the same amount.
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party" while the party making the demand for a modification is called
the "non-investing party."
The main effect of this problem is underinvestment. Professors
Robert Scott & Paul Stephan provide an example that explains how
the hold-up problem leads to underinvestment.9 A simplified version of
this example, using different figures, is as follows: A seller may pro-
duce either general-purpose goods or customized goods, whose costs
are $60 and $100, respectively. The market price of the general-pur-
pose goods is $70. Buyers, on average, value the general-purpose goods
at $80 while a particular buyer values the customized goods at $140.
This buyer proposes to the seller to buy the customized goods at a price
of $120. If a contract is formed, the seller will make a relationship-
specific investment and will receive the price of the customized goods
upon their delivery. The seller, although tempted to agree to the price
of $120, anticipates that the buyer, after the relationship-specific in-
vestment has been made, will propose a new contract price of $80 and
will threaten to breach if this modification is not accepted. The seller
knows that the modification will generate a net loss that amounts to
$20 (the new price of $80 less the cost of $100). In case of breach, the
customized goods will be scraped, making the market value zero. Rem-
edies, assuming the absence of legal enforcement, will also be non-ex-
istent. Thus, a farsighted seller will reject the buyer's offer and will
prefer to manufacture general-purpose goods, which can be sold to
many buyers. In such a case, a certain profit of $10 (the general pur-
pose goods' price of $70, less their cost of $60) will be better than an
uncertain profit of $20 (the idiosyncratic goods' price of $120 less their
cost of $100). The bottom line is that this seller will produce goods that
buyers value at $80 instead of goods that at least a single buyer values
at $140. The deadweight loss for society is $60 (the buyers' valuation of
the general purpose goods, $80 less than the value that the customized
goods have for at least one buyer, $140). Table 1, below, summarizes
these figures.
TABLE 1 - ILLUSTRATION OF UNDERINVESTMENT AND
THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
Concept General Goods Special Goods
Cost (C) $60 $100
Original price (OP) $70 $120
Buyers' valuation (V) $80 $140
Anticipated renegotiated price (RP) The original price $80
Original seller's profit (OSP = OP - C) $10 $20
Anticipated seller's profit (AP = RP - C) $10 -$20
Loss (value of the general goods - value of the customized goods) -$60
9 ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (2006).
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Several strategies, the so-called "governance structures,""
may be used to deal with the hold-up problem, and to prevent its main
harmful effect: underinvestment. Some examples include government
regulation, vertical integration between seller and buyer, stringent
rules on economic duress, and stringent rules on bad-faith, allowing a
held-up party to successfully challenge an extorted modification before
a court.'1 The scope of this article, however, is restricted to the discus-
sion of two strategies that may prevent the hold-up problem: penalty
clauses and a high level of legal remedies for breach of contract. This is
the purpose of the next section. 12
II. THE ROLE OF PENALTY CLAUSES AND LEGAL REMEDIES FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE PREVENTION OF THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
A. The Role of Penalty Clauses on the Prevention of the Hold-up
Problem
1. Introduction
Penalty clauses, by which the parties to a contract provide the
level of remedies to be paid in case one of them refuses to honor its
duties, may prevent the hold-up problem by making breaches more ex-
pensive and, consequently, by reducing the credibility of the threat to
breach backing a demand for a redistributive modification. This sec-
tion will analyze this reasoning in deeper detail.
2. The Legal Rules on Penalty Clauses Under Colombian Law
Colombian Civil Code articles 1592 to 1601 and Colombian
Commercial Code article 867 set forth the legal rules governing pen-
alty clauses. These legal rules may be broken down in the following
five parts. First, and more importantly, penalty clauses are enforcea-
ble in Colombia and, therefore, the breaching party must pay the en-
tire amount.13 Second, the breaching party shall pay the amount of the
penalty clause to the aggrieved party regardless of whether the breach
10 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 151.
11 See Nick Van der Beek, Long-term Contracts and Relational Contracts, in CON-
TRACT LAW & ECONOMICS, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 281, 284 (Gerrit
De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
12 Incidentally, while the analysis of penalties clauses and legal remedies for
breach of contract is made under Colombian law, some references to the U.S. law
exist.
13 Compare C.C. art. 1592 (Colom.), C.C. art. 1599 (Colom.), and C. COM. art 867
(Colom.) (permitting penalties for breach) with U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2014) (permit-
ting liquidated damages for breach, but not penalties) (unless otherwise noted, the
references to the U.C.C. in this paper are to the official text that the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws have enacted).
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caused any damages.1 4 Third, the aggrieved party may request the
payment of the penalty clause, on top of legal damages, if the contract
explicitly provides this accumulation of remedies. Under this scenario,
a penalty clause will be a real punishment. 15
If the contract does not explicitly provide for the accumulation
of the penalty and damages, the aggrieved party will receive the larger
amount between proven legal damages and the penalty clause. 16 In
this case, the penalty clause is just an estimation of damages. This
closely resembles liquidated damage clauses under U.S. law,1 7 and
therefore, it is a misnomer. In any event, while both kinds of penalty
clauses may prevent the hold-up problem, efficiency is enhanced when
the breaching party must pay both the penalty, and the legal
damages. 18
Fourth, a partially performing breaching party, regardless of
whether the damages are re-expressible in monetary terms, is entitled
to request a pro-rata reduction of the penalty. 19 Fifth, if the breaching
party failed either to pay an amount of money or to perform any other
duty that is re-expressible in monetary terms, the amount of the pen-
alty shall not be higher than the amount of this duty.20 For instance,
14 See C.C. art. 1599 (Colom.); see also JORGE SUESCJN MELO, Derecho Privado,
Estudios de Derecho Civil y Comercial Contempordneo [Private Law, Studies on
Contemporaneous Civil and Commercial Law] 43-45 (1996) (categorizing a penalty
clause as an irrebuttable presumption for the breaching party, who cannot claim
that the breach did not cause any harm, and as a rebuttable presumption for the
aggrieved party, who can prove that damages were larger than the amount of the
penalty clause). For arbitral awards holding that the party who seeks the payment
of a penalty clause does not need to prove damages resulting from the breach, see
also, e.g., Comercial Okasa Ltda., v. Banco Colpatria Red Multibanca Colpatria
S.A. (mayo 27, 2004) (C. Torrente Arb.).
15 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala Civ., junio 23,
2000, M.P: G. Gomez, Expediente C-4823, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. CCXII, p.
482) (Colom.); MELO, supra note 14, at 43-45; see also, e.g., Impsa Andina S.A. v.
Argosy Energy International (diciembre 12, 2000) (J. Cabrera, R. NMifiez, H. Chaux
Arb.) (mentioning arbitral awards with this dual role of penalty clauses).
16 See C.C. art. 1600 (Colom.).
17 See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2014).
18 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala Civ., junio 23,
2000, M.P: G. Ramirez, Expediente C-4823, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. CCXII, p.
482) (Colom.) (arguing that the amount of a penalty clause must be sufficiently
high to persuade the promisor that the only profitable road is compliance with the
contract); Comercial Okasa Ltda., v. Banco Colpatria Red Multibanca Colpatria
S.A. (mayo 27, 2004) (C. Torrente Arb.) (contending that a penalty clause whose
amount must be paid on top of legal damages works as a psychological pressure
against the promisor).19 See C.C. art. 1596; C. COM. art. 867.
20 See C. COM. art. 867.
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and pursuant to a plain-meaning reading of Commercial Code article
867, if the seller fails to deliver the goods, the penalty, in addition to
damages,2 1 cannot be larger than the contract price.2 2
If, by contrast, the breaching party fails to perform a duty
which is not re-expressible in monetary terms, as happens when the
quality of the goods is not in accordance with the contract provisions
and the quality diminution cannot be measured in money, a court may
reduce the amount of the penalty taking into account the equity and
the importance of compliance for the aggrieved party.2 3
3. The Role of Penalty Clauses on the Prevention of the Hold-up
Problem
Penalty clauses have some features that may prevent the hold-
up problem. As a first feature, the amount of a penalty clause, by pro-
viding at least two kinds of damages that the law rarely awards, might
be closer to the actual harm in comparison with conventional dam-
ages.2 1 On the one hand, unforeseeable damages, such as consequent-
ial losses, could be provided.2 5 Consequential damages might arise in
hold-up situations. To illustrate, suppose that a buyer makes a rela-
tionship-specific investment building an aluminum factory and enters
into contracts to supply aluminum to its clients downstream. Up-
stream however, only one seller can provide at competitive prices the
main raw material needed to manufacture aluminum: electricity. If
this seller breaches the contract, the buyer would suffer the conse-
quential damages resulting from not honoring the contracts for sale of
aluminum.
Second, the contract might provide damages that the court con-
siders too remote, speculative, or uncertain to award if not contem-
plated by the parties at the making of the contract.2 6 Penalty clauses
might "afford the only possibility of compensation for losses that are
21 Cases where the seller fails to deliver the goods might easily lead to damages
well in excess of the price. A different reading of the rule would be illogical, since
the penalty clause will not cover damages in most cases.
22 See C. COM. art. 867.
23 See id.; MELO, supra note 14, at 45.
24 Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 366 (Wis. 1983) ("[1In providing for stipu-
lated damages, the parties to the contract could anticipate the types of damages
not usually awarded by law.").
25 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 449, 820 (2008).
26 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 572 (1977); Aaron Edlin & Alan
Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHL-KENT L. REV. 33, 34-35 (2003).
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not susceptible of proof with sufficient certainty."27 For example, a
buyer might bargain for a penalty clause whose amount includes
losses that are non-verifiable to a court, such as the goodwill losses
resulting from its seller delivering idiosyncratic goods lacking the
quality agreed in the contract.
As a second feature, penalty clauses allow a promisor to credi-
bly communicate to the promisee that the contract will be honored.2"
As Judge Posner put it: "[p]enalty clauses provide an earnest of per-
formance."2 9 The credibility of the promise derives from the promisee's
assumption that a promisor intending to breach would not commit it-
self to pay an amount in damages larger than the estimated harm (i.e.,
would not signal its intention to perform its duties).3 °
Penalty clauses, because of their signaling function, might effi-
ciently address hold-up situations. Recall that a potentially held-up
party might refrain from making an idiosyncratic investment in order
to avoid the risk that the non-investing party demands a redistributive
modification under threat to breach during the performance stage. A
penalty clause, however, might signal that the non-investing party in-
tends to perform as originally agreed and, therefore, make the poten-
tially held-up party less hesitant to enter the contract and to make a
specific investment.
As a third feature, penalty clauses work as an insurance policy
against breach that the promisor issues in favor of the promisee. 1 The
premium of this insurance policy is the extra price that the promisor
charges as consideration for agreeing to pay damages in excess of the
estimated loss. 3 2 This insurance characteristic of penalty clauses may
shift the risk from the held-up party to the non-investing party. 33 This
27 FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 811; see also Larry A. DiMatteo, Penalties as
Rational Response to Bargaining Irrationality, 2006 MICH. STATE L. REV. 883, 909
(mentioning that liquidated damages clauses [and penalty clauses as well] may
protect subjective valuations that the law does not recognize).
28 See Samuel A. Rea Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated
Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 156-57 (1984); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118, 127-28 (7th ed. 2017).
29 Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985).
30 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THE-
ORY AND THE LAW 308, 315 (1998) (Signaling means that one party conveys non-
verifiable information (e.g., the likelihood of honoring a contract) to the other
party).
31 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 216, 236-37 (3rd ed.
2000); UGo MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 186, 184 (1997).
32 See Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger L. Miller & Timothy J. Muris, Liquidated
Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Non-sense, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351, 367-68; and
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 31, at 236.
33 See Rea, supra note 28, at 148; MATTEI, supra note 31, at 184.
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feature is linked to the signaling function and, more particularly, to an
efficient distribution of information costs. An investing party cannot
ascertain, without considerable expenses, whether the other party will
pull a hold up. A penalty clause, working as an insurance policy, pro-
vides this information.3 4
Penalty clauses work efficiently as insurance policies when two
conditions are present: the promisee will suffer an idiosyncratic loss in
case of breach, and the promisor is the cheapest insurer.3 5 Both condi-
tions might arise in hold-up situations. To begin with, a held-up party
might suffer an idiosyncratic loss if the contract is breached because
its relationship-specific investment would likely be scrap and the in-
formation about the actual losses may be non-verifiable to a court.3 6
The non-investing party, in turn, is the cheapest insurer or,
perhaps, the only insurer in hold-up situations. Since the investment
is idiosyncratic, the held-up party will likely be unable to obtain insur-
ance in the market. Assuming, arguendo, that such market exists, an
insurance policy that a third-party issues would likely be more expen-
sive and less effective than the insurance that the non-investing party
is willing to provide through a penalty clause. A promisor is the cheap-
est insurer because it knows with higher certainty than any other
party whether a hold-up situation will arise.3 7 On top of that, the
transaction costs of issuing an insurance policy have already been in-
curred in the negotiation of the contract between the investing and the
non-investing parties.38
Unfortunately for held-up parties, the legal limits and the pow-
ers that courts have to reduce the amount of a penalty clause may im-
pair their efficiency on the prevention of the hold-up problem.
Notwithstanding, the legal rule stating that a penalty shall not exceed
the amount of a duty to pay some money or which is otherwise re-
expressible in monetary terms should not restrict the role of a penalty
clause on the prevention of the hold-up problem if the contract pro-
vides that the penalty is in addition to damage. In contrast, the rule
stating that a court may reduce the amount of a penalty when its value
is not re-expressible in monetary terms is more favorable, on first im-
pression, for non-investing parties than for held-up parties because eq-
uity may lead a court to reduce the amount of a penalty, but rarely to
34 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-
tract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 617 (2003).
35 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 31, at 236-37.
36 See Aristides N. Hatzis, Having the Cake and Eating it Too: Efficient Penalty
Clauses in Common and Civil Contract Law, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 387
(2006).
37 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 26, at 578-582; Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 26,
at 38, n.12.
38 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 26, at 580.
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keep it unchanged and never to increase it.39 As a result, a held-up
party would find it very difficult if not impossible to precisely predict
the percentage of reduction at the time of making an idiosyncratic in-
vestment. Such percentage, for instance, may depend on the judges in
charge of the case, on their attitudes during the trial, or on the sympa-
thies that the non-investing party generates. 40 Another ground to re-
duce the amount of a penalty clause is the importance of performance
in nature for the aggrieved party. This factor should work well for
held-up parties, which, by definition, are strongly interested in specific
and timely performance to avoid losing their relationship-specific
investments.
Summing up, and taking into account not only their features
already described but also the fact that they are enforceable in Colom-
bia, penalty clauses might prevent the hold-up problem. This is the
good news. The bad news is that the legal caps and the power that
courts have to reduce the amount of a penalty may impair its efficiency
on the prevention of the hold-up problem. Ultimately, empirical analy-
ses will have the last say about whether the positive effects of penal-
ties are greater than its limitations (the negative effects). The
experiment that this article reports is a step in that direction. Before
describing its design, the rules on legal remedies for breach of contract
and its role on the prevention of the hold-up problem must be ana-
lyzed. This is the purpose of the next section.
B. The Role of Remedies for Breach of Contract in Prevention of the
Hold-up Problem
1. Introduction
While legal remedies are under-compensatory in all con-
tracts,41 the degree of under-compensation is not always the same.
Contracts that can be enforced without too much delay and at a low
cost lie at one end of the spectrum; the degree of under-compensation
is minimal. Suppose, for instance, that two parties enter a spot con-
39 In addition, equity is an important, but nebulous concept. See generally Gillian
K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Preci-
sion in The Law, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 541 (1994) (discussing the economic role of vague
legal rules).
40 See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
162 (1949) (implying that justice is what the judge ate for breakfast).
41 That legal remedies for breach of contract are inherently under-compensatory
is a statement that triggers minimum debate nowadays. The scholars contending
that remedies for breach of contract are under-compensatory are legion. See, e.g.,
Goetz & Scott, supra note 26, at 558 n.19; Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract
Modification Under the U.C.C.: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress,
64 IowA L. REV. 849, 878 (1979).
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tract for the sale of a commodity; in case of breach, the market price
and the price of a cover transaction might easily be determined. As-
sume also that the nature of the transaction, which is standardized,
makes the length of trial, or even of a settlement, very short. Hold-up
situations, in turn, lie close to the other end of the spectrum; their
degree of under-compensation might be significant. After all, a signifi-
cant part of the damages that an aggrieved held-up party suffers
might be uncertain and unforeseeable; thereby, not recoverable under
legal remedies.4 2
The under-compensatory nature of legal remedies is the reason
why held-up parties are usually better off accepting the offer to modify
rather than rejecting it and suing for breach of contract.4 3 In accor-
dance with this view, the role of legal remedies for breach of contract is
limited to the mitigation of the hold-up problem by minimizing its de-
gree of under-compensation. The degree of under-compensation, how-
ever, cannot be reduced below some threshold without triggering
undesirable effects, such as deterring some efficient breaches,4 4 chil-
ling some efficient contracts if the prospect of a too high level of legal
remedies dissuades risk-averse promisors from entering into con-
tracts,4 5 triggering higher contract prices intended to compensate for
the higher level of legal remedies,46 and leading promisees to
overinvest.4 7
2. The Legal Rules on Remedies for Breach of Contract
Unlike U.S. law,4" as a general rule an aggrieved party to any
bilateral contract under Colombian law may choose between seeking
42 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 31, at 259 ("In general, the error in the court's
estimation of expectation damages decreases as the ease of substitution increases
for the promised performance").
43 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 40, at 891-92 n. 190; Jason Scott Johnston, Default
Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the
Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 337, 338(1993); see gener-
ally Jeffrey M. Dressier, Good Faith Rejection of Goods in A Falling Market, 42
CoNN. L. REV. 611, 639 (2009) ("For businessmen, even a case that is won in litiga-
tion generally represents [at best] an unwanted annoyance.").
44 See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Effi-
cient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 669 (1988); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980).
45 See Craswell, supra note 44, at 669.
46 See id.; Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory
Remedies, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 370 (1990).
47 See Craswell, supra note 44, at 669; Shavell, supra note 44, at 472.
48 See U.C.C. § 2-716 (2014).
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monetary damages and specific performance.4 9 In practice, however,
specific performance is a very limited remedy in the context of com-
mercial contracts for sale or supply of goods, almost as limited as in
U.S. law. While the law does not restrict specific performance to cer-
tain parties to a contract, logical considerations dictate that this rem-
edy is not applicable when an aggrieved seller is seeking the price plus
any default interest. On top of that, buyers can seek monetary dam-
ages only in the form of a price reduction when the breach is minor
(e.g., when goods with some small defects are anyway fit for the partic-
ular contract purpose).5 °
Given these limitations to the remedy of specific performance,
this chapter assumes that the aggrieved held-up party seeks monetary
damages, which are divided into two broad categories. The first one is
actual damages (in Spanish: daho emergente), or the expenses incurred
in preparation of performance. 5 1 An aggrieved party may recover most
actual losses without too much difficulty.5 2 The second category is lost
profits (in Spanish: lucro cesante), which amount to the earnings that
the aggrieved party would have obtained if the contract would not
have been breached).53
While lost profits are a notion more linked to the under-com-
pensatory nature of remedies since their calculation is not as easy and
precise as actual losses,5 4 the recovery of actual damages may also be
subject to some limitations. For instance, a court may reject the recov-
49 See C. COM. art. 870. For some case law and doctrine regarding the election
between monetary damages and specific performance, see, e.g., Corte Suprema de
Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala Civ., mayo 16, 2002, M.P. J. Santos, Ex-
pediente 6877, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. CCXV, p. 163) (Colom.); Mitsui & Co
Ltd. y Sumitomo Corporation, agosto 22, 2002, R. Bernal, A. Mendoza, J. Cubides
Arb.).50 See C.C. Art. 1924; see generally Philips Colombiana de Comercializaci6n S.A. v.
Cosmitet Limitada Corporaci6n de Servicios M6dicos Internacionales Them y Cia.
Ltda. (abril 21, 2005) (S. Mufioz, M. Silva y M. Plazas Arb.).51 See C.C. Art. 1613-14; Granjas El Socorro Ltda. v. Colombiana de Incubaci6n
S.A. Incubacol (agosto 5, 2002) (H. Mora, A. Herndndez, H. Romero Arb.) [herein-
after Granjas].52 See Gallo's Comunicaciones E.U. v. Super 9 Comunicaciones S.A. (noviembre
17, 2004) (C. de la Torre, H. Cardozo y F. Santos Arb.) [hereinafter Gallo's Com-
municaciones] (arguing that estimation of actual losses is not so difficult because
they refer to past events).53 See C.C. Art. 1613-14. For case law regarding lost profits, see, e.g., Corte
Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., septiembre 9, 2010, M.P.
W. Namn, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. CCXXXJV, p. 563) (Colom.); Granjas, supra
note 51.54 See Gallo's Comunicaciones, supra note 52 (categorizing as uncontroversial that
lost profits are much more difficult to prove than actual losses); see also Corte
Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., marzo 4, 1998, M.P. C.
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ery of the value of a relationship-specific investment, which by defini-
tion, is worthless for an aggrieved buyer after its seller has breached.
In spite of the fact that the lost investment might be an actual dam-
age, since the held-up party exclusively incurred in this sunk cost to
perform the contract, explaining to a court, uninformed of financial
and technical matters, 55 that a complex investment was useful for the
breaching party, but not for anybody else may be an expensive task at
best and an impossible one at worst. Furthermore, since the invest-
ment is registered in the ledger books under this name (as an invest-
ment) and not as an expense, proving otherwise is still more difficult. 5 6
This is not just a theoretical concern. In Ladrillera Santa Fe S.A. v.
STK de Colombia S.A., the plaintiff invested in some equipment and
fiber optic networks without value outside the business relationship
between the parties. Nonetheless, the arbitral tribunal denied recov-
ery of this investment because the plaintiff failed to prove that the
investment lacked any purpose after breach, and the equipment and
fiber optic networks were registered in the ledger books as invest-
ments (assets) and not as expenses.5 7
Lost profits, especially if they are unforeseeable or uncertain,
may also be unrecoverable.5" As an example of limitations on unfore-
seeable losses, a buyer may be denied recovery of the profits resulting
from some future sales to its customers of goods manufactured with
the raw materials to be acquired from the breaching seller on the
ground that this party might have not forecast them. In any event, in
contrast with U.S. law and favorably for held-up parties,59 the extent
of lost profits depends on whether the breaching party acted with the
positive intention to inflict damage on the other person (in Spanish:
"dolo"). If the answer is no, then the breaching party is only liable for
damages foreseeable at the making of the contract.6 0 Alternately, the
breaching party is also liable for any loss directly resulting from the
breach.61 In the context of hold-up situations, a non-investing party
Jaramillo, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. CCXVIII, p. 450) (Colom.); FERNANDO HINES-
TROSA, Tratado De Las Obligaciones [Treaty On Obligations] 224 (3d ed. 2007).
55 Unless the case is decided by arbitrators with expertise in these topics.
56 See D. 2649/93 art. 35,40, 61, 64 diciembre 29, 1993, DRIAO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Colom.); see also Code of General Procedure [hereinafter C.G.P.] art. 264, enacted
by L. 1564/12, julio 12, 2012, DIARIo OFIcIAL [D.O.] (providing that disputes
among merchants will be decided in accordance with their ledger books).
57 See Ladrillera Santa Fe S.A. v. STK de Colombia S.A. (abril 16, 2002) (J.
Chemfs, N. Zabala, y L. Parra Arb.).
58 See HINESTROSA, supra note 54, at 217-18.
59 See Eric A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1431 (2009).
60 See C.C. art. 1616.
61 See id.
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always acts with dolo because it fails to perform in fulfillment of its
threat.
Unlike the restrictions on unforeseeable damages stemming
from Civil and Commercial Codes, the limitations regarding uncertain
losses lie in case law62 which has consistently rejected speculative
damages.63 Naturally, the case law acknowledges that lost profits are,
by definition, probabilistic and, as a result, that the requirement of
certainty is not absolute.64 Unfortunately, the line dividing lost profits
that are probabilistic, but sufficiently certain and other lost profits
that are too speculative to be recovered is blurry. As a consequence,
the broad powers that courts have to determine whether or not some
lost profits are recoverable are not reassuring for a held-up party esti-
mating in advance the damages resulting from breach in order to de-
cide whether or not to accept a demand for an extorted modification.65
The kind of losses that are often uncertain are lost opportuni-
ties, especially if they are contingent on factors other than perform-
ance of the contract. An opportunity is lost when the aggrieved party
cannot obtain the profit of some projected transactions, such as some
deals that an aggrieved held-up buyer were negotiating with some
third-parties and which were suspended shortly after the breach.66
The doctrine and the case law require a significant amount of certainty
about both the causality link between the breach and the lost opportu-
nity and its likelihood (although a lower degree of certainty regarding
its amount).67 Another kind of lost profit, goodwill losses, are usually
unrecoverable due to their speculative nature.6 s
62 See C.C. art. 1614 (defining lost profits without limiting them).
63 See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., sep-
tiembre 9, 2010, M.P. W. Nam6n, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. CCXXXIV, p. 563)
(Colom.) (holding that certainty about the lost profits is a condition to recover
damages); see also MELO, supra note 14, at 197-98 (stating that damages that were
just possible at the time of breach are not recoverable); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a (1981) ("The main impact of the requirement of cer-
tainty comes in connection with lost profits."); Cent. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman,
111 F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1901) (stating that "speculative, remote, or uncertain" dam-
ages "may not form the basis of a lawful judgment.").
64 See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ., septiembre
9, 2010, M.P. W. Nam6n, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. CCXXXIV, p. 563) (Colom.);
HINESTROSA, supra note 54, at 199-200.
65 See HINESTROSA, supra note 54, at 199-200.
66 See JAVIER TAMAyo, II LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL [TORTS] 30 (1986).
67 See id. at 357; Productora Tabacalera de Colombia S.A.S. Protabaco S.A.S.
(Protabaco) v. Divisi6n Mayor del Fdtbol Colombiano (Dimayor) (septiembre 9,
2011) (M. Castro, E. Rengifo, L. Salazar Arb.); HINESTROSA, supra note 54.
68 See Granjas, supra note 51 (rejecting the recovery of good will losses because of
its lack of certainty).
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Other kind of losses, which do not exactly fit in the categories
of actual damages and lost profits, may also be unrecoverable. The ex-
penses necessary to recover at least part of the losses are an example.
Colombian law entitles the party prevailing at trial to get back its rea-
sonable attorney's fees and other judgment costs (in Spanish, the so-
called "costas"). 69 At first sight, this is good news for an aggrieved
held-up party. The outlook, unfortunately, is not so favorable. To begin
with, the costs of enforcing a contract in Colombia add up to 46% of the
claim.7 ° Courts usually reject a fraction of this 46% on the grounds
that it is non-verifiable, unreasonable or higher than the statutory
limits. 1
As an additional restriction to legal remedies, monetary dam-
ages are only obtained after considerable delay. Thus, even a party
prevailing at trial and obtaining the whole amount claimed as dam-
ages suffers a monetary loss in real terms. This loss depends on the
length of the legal procedures. The World Bank's study mentioned ear-
lier finds that Colombian legal procedures are very protracted. 72 Ac-
cording to this multilateral institution, 34 procedures and 1,346 days
(almost four years) are required to enforce a contract in Colombia.7 3
On top of that, the figures indicated above are for standardized com-
mercial disputes."4 As a result, the time and cost of hold-up litigation
may be longer and higher.
In sum, it is settled that legal remedies for breach of contract
are inherently under-compensatory, so settled that it is almost a tau-
69 See C.G.P. art. 361-66. For the former rule, see C.P.C. art. 392.
70 This percentage is disaggregated as follows: attorney's fees (23.2%); judgment
costs (12.6%); and enforcement costs (12.1%). See THE WORLD BANK, EASE OF Do-
ING BUSINESS IN COLOMBIA (2013), http:/! www.doingbusiness.org/data/ex-
ploreeconomies/Colombial#enforcing-contracts (last visited, Nov. 13, 2014).
71 See Rule 1887 art. 1 (junio 26, 2003), Sala Administrativa Consejo Superior de
la Judicatura; see also L. 794103 art. 43, enero 8, 2003, DLIUO OFICIAL [D.O.] (set-
ting forth that judgment costs include any expense assumed by the prevailing
party in relation to the litigation provided that they are proved, have been useful
for the settling of the dispute, and relate to acts that the law authorizes). An ag-
grieved party will also be unable to recover other non-verifiable litigation expenses
such as the monetary value of the personnel's time employed in litigation (e.g.,
estimating the losses, attempting to reach a settlement, etc.). See Ladrillera Santa
Fe S.A. v. STK de Colombia S.A. (abril 16, 2002) (J. Chemds, N. Zabala y L. Parra
Arb.) (rejecting the expenses on personnel who was allegedly and exclusively dedi-
cated to the litigation on the grounds that the conditions required to be a recover-
able damage were not met).
72 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 70.73 See id.
74 See THE WORLD BANK, ENFORCING CONTRACTS METHODOLOGY, http:l!
www.doingbusiness.orglmethodology/enforcing-contracts. The timing (but not the
cost) of arbitration may be much shorter.
COLOMBIAN CONTRACT LAW
tology. Indeed, remedies for breach of contracts cannot be fully com-
pensatory unless some undesirable effects arise, such as deterring
efficient breaches. As a result, the role of legal remedies on the preven-
tion of the hold-up problem is limited to mitigation. Despite this limi-
tation, a high level of remedies may mitigate the hold-up problem to a
greater extent than a low level. Specifically, high remedies may have a
prophylactic effect on the hold-up problem by reducing or eliminating
the credibility of the threat to breach the contract that a non-investing
party makes.75 This is the theoretical prediction that needs to be em-
pirically tested.
III. A REVIEW OF 'THE LITERATURE ON EXPERIMENTS ON THE HOLD-
UP PROBLEM
Since other experiments testing theories related to the hold-up
problem provide some guidance for the design of this article's experi-
ment, Section III reviews them, organized from the oldest to the new-
est. First, Professor Steven C. Hackett predicted that the division of
contractual surplus depends on the party who makes a "sunk" invest-
ment and on its value. His results confirmed this prediction.76 Draw-
ing on Professor Hackett's findings, this experiment assumes that the
contractual surplus of the parties to a contract for sale of goods de-
pends on the "sunk" investment that the buyer makes and tests
whether penalty clauses and legal remedies for breach of contract may
attenuate this conclusion. Second, Professors Hessel Oosterbeek, Joep
Sonnemans & Susan Van Velzen tested the essential theory underly-
ing the hold-up problem; that is, the theory predicting that people un-
derinvest in relationship-specific assets. They found that the players
underinvested although it did not occur to the degree that the theory
predicts.7 7
Third, Professors Randolph Sloof, Joep Sonnemans & Hessel
Oosterbeek tested the theory predicting that an increase of outside op-
tions may induce the efficient level of investment and, as a result, pre-
vent the hold-up problem. Outside options are payments that the held-
up party receives when the non-investing party breaches the contract.
This experiment is relevant here because both penalties and legal rem-
75 See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717,
735 (2005) ("The more severe the remedies that the threatening party expects to
bear in case of breach, the less credible his threat.").
76 See Steven C. Hackett, Incomplete Contracting: A Laboratory Experimental
Analysis, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 274 (1993).
77 Hessel Oosterbeek, Joep Sonnemans & Susan Van Velzen, Bargaining with En-
dogenous Pie Size and Disagreement Points, 1999 J. POPULATION ECON. 1, 14
(1999). The authors, however, did not explain why players decided to invest larger
sums than the theory predicted. See id. at 14.
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edies for breach of contract, which may prevent the hold-up problem,
are examples of outside options.
In contrast with the theoretical predictions, Professors Sloof,
Sonnemans & Oosterbeek found that the level of investments did not
depend on the amount of the outside option. According to this finding,
the usefulness of outside options to prevent the hold-up problem is"rather limited in practice."7 8 Notwithstanding, Professors Sloof, Son-
nemans & Oosterbeek also concluded that the under-investment effect
of the hold-up problem is not as harmful in practice as it seems in
theory after observing that subjects made investments that were be-
low efficient levels but above the levels that the theory predicted. 79
Fourth, the three authors of the last experiment and Professor
Arno Riedl tested the theory by predicting that legal remedies would
prevent the hold-up problem and determined whether this excessive
protection would lead to overinvestment. The result of this experiment
confirmed the predictions of the theory.8 0 Fifth, Professors Tore Elling-
sen & Magnus Johannesson performed an experiment where bilateral
bargaining followed some unilateral investments. The results, as the
theory predicted, indicated that relationship-specific investments
weakened the bargaining power of held-up parties during the perform-
ance stage and, consequently, made them vulnerable to redistributive
modifications."1
Finally, Professors Jose R. Antiqueira, Sylvia Saes, and Sergio
G. Lazzarini tested the theory predicting that relationship-specific in-
vestments lead to renegotiations reducing the investing party's sur-
plus. In the first stage, subjects acting as sellers decided whether or
not to build a factory to manufacture a product that might be sold to a
buyer if a contract were successfully negotiated. Building this factory
was a relationship-specific investment since all other buyers' centers
were far away. Subjects acting as buyers, in turn, decided whether to
buy the product either from the seller making the investment or from a
foreign manufacturer at a fixed price.8 2 In the second stage, happening
after the factory had been built, sellers were informed that the price
that the foreign manufacturer was willing to charge might have been
reduced; buyers, however, learned that this price has not really
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 Randolph Sloof, Hessel Oosterbeek, Arno Riedl & Joep Sonnemans, Breach
Remedies, Reliance and Renegotiation, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 290-91
(2006).
81 See Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, Is There a Hold-Up Problem?, 106
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 475, 476-77 (2004).
82 See Jose R. Antiqueira, Maria Saes, & Sergio G. Lazzarini,'Hold-Up' in Negotia-
tions Involving Specific Investments: An Experimental Investigation (Jan. 20,
2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957790.
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changed. Put it another way, buyers were able to falsely claim that
they could replace their sellers with another supplier as a strategy to
obtain a renegotiation of the contract price. Professors Antiqueira,
Saes, and Lazzarini reported that while 62.7% of the buyers obtained a
reduction of the original contract price, the new price was below the
seller's costs, making the investment unprofitable in only 14.7% of all
cases.8 3 Professors Antiqueira, Saes,*and Lazzarini speculate that be-
havioral reasons may explain the differences between the theory, pre-
dicting a higher frequency of hold-ups and a larger reduction of the
contract price, and the experiment.8 4 In particular, reputation con-
cerns or social norms might have deterred some participants from
making more aggressive demands. s5
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Treatments
A bargaining experiment with three treatments is used to test
the theories about penalty clauses and legal remedies for breach of
contract.8 6 The first treatment is the control or general one while the
second and third treatments respectively test the role of penalty
clauses and a high level of legal remedies for breach of contract on the
prevention of the hold-up problem.8 7 This section describes the first
treatment in detail and then explains the other two treatments in ref-
erence to the first one.
1. First (General) Treatment
Buyco is a buyer in the business of manufacturing and selling
aluminum to its customers downstream while Selco is a seller in the
business of extracting and selling bauxite, an indispensable input in
the production of aluminum. Selco's costs of extracting and delivering
one indivisible unit of bauxite are $1000. Buyers of bauxite other than
Buyco are very far away and, therefore, not willing to pay more than
$500 for the bauxite.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 6.
86 See Croson, supra note 5, at 938 (explaining that most experimental designs
have between three and six treatments).
87 Thus, the second and the third treatment differ from the first treatment in only
one factor. See id. at 939 (stating that if treatments differ in two or more factors
and result in different behavior, the investigator would not be able to identify
which factor is causing the change in the results).
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Buyco intends to use the bauxite and other inputs in the manu-
facturing of one customized indivisible unit of aluminum."8 This unit
is intended to be delivered to a customer downstream, Cusco. The esti-
mated costs of this manufacturing process are $1000. On top of that,
Buyco will make a relationship-specific investment amounting to
$1500 to customize the aluminum in accordance with Cusco's require-
ments. If, for any reason, Buyco cannot take delivery of the bauxite
from Selco and due to this customization, the investment would be al-
most worthless (it can be sold as scrap at $500). If Buyco closes the
deal with Selco, it would also close the deal with Cusco at a price of
$7500. Otherwise, the contract with Cusco will not be agreed on and,
of course, the relationship-specific investment will not be made. Cusco
has accepted this price, and not a lower one, on the condition that
Buyco delivers the customized aluminum according to a tight schedule
provided in the contract because time is of the essence. If Buyco does
not deliver the aluminum on time, Cusco will be entitled to refuse de-
livery; in this case, Cusco will make some adjustments to its plant and
will use a non-customized kind of aluminum that it has on inventory.
After learning this information, subjects playing the roles of
sellers sent an offer for the sale of bauxite and subjects playing the
roles of buyers decided whether to accept or reject it. If the offer was
accepted, the contract was formed and subjects participated in the sec-
ond stage of the experiment. In contrast, if both buyers rejected the
offer, their sellers did not participate in the second stage. These par-
ticipants, however, stayed in the same place doing a moot task in order
not to signal to the other subjects that they did not make a contract.
For buyers, the moot task consisted of explaining in few words why
they did not accept their sellers' offers. All sellers, in turn, assumed
that their buyers had accepted their first offers and, if this assumption
turned false, the seller's offer in the second stage was moot. 9
It was efficient for the parties to enter the contract since Selco's
costs of manufacturing one indivisible unit of bauxite were $1000
while Buyco's profit of selling one indivisible unit of aluminum was
$5000 before subtracting the price of the bauxite. Put it differently,
Selco should have been willing to sell the bauxite at any price above
$1000 while Buyco should have been willing to buy the bauxite at any
88 Most idiosyncratic contracts for sale of goods provide the delivery of several
units during the contract term. This experiment, for the sake of simplicity, as-
sumes that the parties to the contract trade one indivisible unit of the goods,
which is equivalent to the total number of units that are manufactured and deliv-
ered in similar contracts in real business life.
89 This assumption saved the time that would have been necessary to inform sell-
ers whether or not their buyers had accepted the offers.
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price below $5000. The efficient range of contracting is, therefore,
($1000, $5000). Table 2 summarizes these figures.
TABLE 2: MAIN FIGURES OF THE HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
Concept Value
Selco's cost of extracting and delivering one unit of bauxite $1000
Price that buyers other than Buyco will pay for the bauxite $500
Price of the customized aluminum that Buyco would sell to Cusco (AP) $7500
Buyco's costs of manufacturing the customized aluminum (MC) $1000
Buyco's investment required to manufacture the bauxite (I) $1500
Value of the investment (scrap) if Buyco cannot get the bauxite from Selco $500
Buyco's total costs (TC = MC + I) $2500
Buyco's profit before subtracting the cost of the bauxite (P = AP - TC) $5000
Price at which Selco would sell the bauxite to Buyco TBD
During the second stage, all participants that entered the con-
tract in the first stage were informed that Buyco had made its rela-
tionship-specific investment and that Selco's costs were still $1000 but
that the price that another buyer of bauxite (Thirdco) was willing to
pay for this raw material, which had been $500 during the first stage,
might have changed. Due to production constraints, a seller delivering
the bauxite to Thirdco would not be able to sell this mineral to Buyco.
Buyers were also informed that Thirdco's offer was revealed to sellers
in a confidential envelope. All envelopes, however, contained the same
price as in the first stage, $500. The price remained unchanged to cre-
ate an information asymmetry between sellers and buyers. Thus, sell-
ers were allowed to falsely claim to their buyers that they had received
better offers for the sale of one indivisible unit of bauxite. Information
about this alternative trading opportunity was non-verifiable for buy-
ers; that is, buyers were unable to check at a reasonable cost in the
market the real or approximate price that Thirdco might have
offered.9 0
90 A held-up buyer, instead of a held-up seller, is chosen for this experiment be-
cause the undercompensatory nature of remedies is more acute in the former than
in the latter case on the following grounds. First, limitations on unforeseeable
damages are infrequently a problem when the seller is the aggrieved party. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 826-27 (stating that an aggrieved seller is not enti-
tled to recover consequential damages resulting from its, inability to pay some
money to its creditors on the grounds that such money is available in the capital
markets, unless there is a credit crunch). Indeed, sellers' consequential damages
are rare. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
301 (5th ed. 2000). In contrast, an aggrieved held-up buyer may have failed to
meet commitments with its customers downstream and, therefore, have suffered
significant damages, some of which its seller may have not foreseen. Second, limi-
tations on uncertain or speculative losses are usually less problematic for a seller
than for a buyer. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 830-33. Cf RESTATEMENT
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Thus, if Selco breaches, Buyco would be unable to timely find
another supplier at a reasonable cost to meet its tight deadline with
Cusco (that is, Buyco would breach its contract with Cusco). In such a
case, Buyco would not lose either the price of the bauxite because the
contract provided payment upon delivery or the costs of manufacturing
the aluminum, taking into account that Buyco would have not begun
this process at the time Selco would have breached.
Buyco, however, would suffer the following losses. First, Buyco
would lose the expected net profit of the transaction with Cusco. This
profit equaled the contract price of the aluminum ($7500) minus the
sum of the manufacturing costs ($1000) and the price of the bauxite,
which varied among participants. Thus, the net profit would be $6500
minus the contract price. Second, Buyco should pay to Cusco the value
of a penalty clause, amounting to $300. Third, the relationship-specific
investment ($1500) would be scrap with a market value of only $500.
Fourth, due to its stained reputation, other Buyco's customers would
stop doing business with this company and, as a result, the lost oppor-
tunities would amount to $300. Fifth, Buyco would also suffer other
good will losses valued at $200. Sixth and finally, expected litigation
expenses would amount to $700 (including the cost of enforcing a
favorable judgment). These expenses are disaggregated in attorney
fees ($400) and other judgment costs ($300). On top of that, the ex-
pected time between the breach of contract and the enforcement of a
favorable judgment is four years while the likelihood of Selco prevail-
ing in court is 10% (e.g., the court holds that Selco did not breach but
legally terminated the contract). Table 3 summarizes these figures.
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) § 352 cmt. b ("[Piroof of [seller's] lost profit will
ordinarily not be difficult. If, however, it is the buyer who claims lost profit on the
ground that the seller's breach has caused him loss in other transactions, the task
of proof is harder."). For a seller, even assuming that cover were not possible, a
court is not likely to face great difficulties in estimating the difference between the
contract price and the costs and other expenses saved due to the breach. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 830. These difficulties are almost nonexistent if a
seller is entitled to the contract price. See FARNSWORTH (CONTRACTS), supra note
116, at 796. In any event, the experiment could have been the other way without
loss of generality; that is, the seller as the held-up party and the buyer as the non-
investing company threatening to breach the contract if the price is not decreased.
After all, the crucial feature of the hold-up problem in contracts for sale of goods is
not the role of the investing party (either the buyer or the seller) but the fact that
it cannot make a cover transaction if the contract is breached due to its relation-
ship-specific investment.
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TABLE 3: Buyco's LOSSES
Losses Value
Expected profit $6500 - contract price
Relationship-specific investment $1000
Penalty paid to Cusco $300
Loss of business opportunities $300
Good will losses $200
Litigation expenses $700
Total $9000 - contract price
If Selco breaches the contract and Buyco sues Selco for this rea-
son, Buyco would recover the following damages. First, although other
suppliers of bauxite are far away to deliver this mineral to Buyco at a
reasonable cost and taking into account that the available existences
of bauxite would have been delivered to Thirdco, this article assumes
that a court would deny specific performance.9 1 The court, instead,
would assume that Buyco might have manufactured standard alumi-
num using the bauxite and might have obtained a reasonable market
profit amounting to $5850 minus the price of the bauxite.9 2 Second,
the court would refuse to grant to Buyco the value of the penalty
($300) that it shall pay to Cusco, and the value of the now almost
worthless relationship-specific investment (a loss of $1000 after taking
into account the market value of the scrap) on the grounds that the
penalty is a consequential damage that Buyco did not mention to Selco
at the making of the contract and that the investment may be used for
other purposes. 93 Third, the court would only grant $200 out of the
$300 value of lost opportunities (this sum already takes into account
the 90% likelihood of Buyco prevailing at trial), rejecting the other
$100 due to its speculative nature. The court would refuse to grant any
damages related to good will losses on the same grounds. Fourth, the
court would only grant to Buyco $450 for attorney costs and other
judgment costs. $450 is the value of the attorney and other judgment
costs that a court would find reasonable ($500), adjusted for the 90%
likelihood of Buyco prevailing at trial.94 Table 4 summarizes the dam-
ages that Buyco would receive in case of breach of contract. These
91 This assumption is made because the purpose of this experiment is not to test
the role of specific performance on the prevention of the hold-up problem. See gen-
erally C. COM. art. 870.
92 This profit before taking into account the price of the bauxite might be disaggre-
gated into a market price of $7000 for standard aluminum and a variable manu-
facturing cost equal to $500. The net profit of $6500, adjusted by the 90%
likelihood of Buyco prevailing in trial, equals $5850.
93 See C.C. art. 1616.
94 See C.G.P. art. 361-66 (providing break out of how damages are awarded, rates,
and types of fees).
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figures, incidentally, are common knowledge for both buyers and
sellers.
TABLE 4: DAMAGES IN THE FIRST TREATMENT
Damages Actual Loss Remedies
Expected profit $6500 - Contract price $5850 - Contract price
Relationship-specific investment $1000 $0
Penalty paid to Cusco $300 $0
Lost opportunities $300 $200
Good will losses $200 $0
Litigation expenses $700 $450
Total $9000 - Contract price $6500 - Contract price
Difference between actual loss and remedies 2500
Based on this information, the bargaining round began. This
round was divided into the following two parts. First, subjects acting
as sellers demanded a new price (pi) threatening to breach the con-
tract if Buyco rejected this offer (a take-it-or-leave-it offer). Standard
theory, assuming rational actors and that utility only results from
money, predicts that the new price (pl) should be higher than the origi-
nal contract price (P0). Sellers' offers may have either said the truth
about Thirdco's offer or may have falsely claimed that the offered price
was higher. Sellers used the following message: "We think that the
contract price is too low considering the current conditions of the mar-
ket, especially after receiving a Thirdco's offer for our bauxite at a
price of $ . We propose to you the following new price . If this
new price is not accepted, our company will breach the contract and
sell the bauxite to Thirdco"
Second, subjects acting as buyers decided whether or not to ac-
cept the new price (pi). Buyers were not allowed to make counterof-
fers. 5 If the offer was accepted, the experiment ended with a new
price agreement. Otherwise, buyers immediately learned that their
sellers did not carry out their threats (that is, that they did not breach
the contract). Recall that since Thirdco's offer was $500, while the orig-
inal contract price should have been at least $1000, breach would be
inefficient. Thus, in this case, the experiment ended without a new
price agreement (i.e., the final price was the agreed price during the
first stage).
2. Second Treatment - Penalty Clauses
In contrast with the general treatment, the contract between
Selco and Buyco in the second treatment provided an enforceable pen-
alty clause. Pursuant to this clause, any party breaching the contract
95 The rationale of this restriction is that held-up parties usually have little or
zero bargaining power.
2015] COLOMBIAN CONTRACT LAW
shall pay to the aggrieved party $7000 regardless of the quantity of
actual damages. This value already takes into account the likelihood of
a court reducing its amount.9 6 Table 5 summarizes the damages appli-
cable to this treatment.
TABLE 5: DAMAGES IN THE SECOND TREATMENT
Damages Actual Loss Remedies
Expected profit $6500 - Contract price
Relationship-specific investment $1000
Penalty paid to Cusco $300 $7000
Lost opportunities $300
Good will losses $200
Litigation expenses $700
Total $9000 - Contract price
Difference between actual loss and remedies 2000 - Contract price
9 7
3. Third Treatment - High level of Legal Remedies
In this treatment, a court would grant a higher level of reme-
dies in comparison with the general treatment. More specifically, a
new Colombian legal rule would entitle Buyco to fully recover its rela-
tionship-specific investment and also to recover a greater amount of
other losses, as Table 6 shows.
TABLE 6: DAMAGES IN THE THIRD TREATMENT
Damages Actual Loss Remedies
Expected profit $6500 - Contract price $5850- Contract price
Relationship-specific investment $1000 $1000
Penalty paid to Cusco $300 $200
Lost opportunities $300 $200
Good will losses $200 $150
Litigation expenses $700 $600
Total $9000 - Contract price $8000 - Contract price
Difference between actual loss and remedies 1000
B. Main Features and Controls of the Experiment
Researchers performed this experiment in Medellfn, Colombia.
Undergraduate students enrolled in law programs in Universidad
96 For example, assume that the original value of the penalty clause is $9000 and
that a court will reduce it to $6000 and $4000 with a 25% and 25% likelihood,
respectively. It follows that the expected value of the penalty clause is
$11,000*50% + $8000*25% + $6000*25% = $7000.
97 Thus, if the original contract price is above $2000, a breach would make Buyco
better off in comparison with performance of the contract (of course, provided that
Buyco successfully collect the amount of the penalty from the breaching seller).
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EAFIT and Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana acted as subjects. Ac-
cording to the curriculum of their law programs, they might have had
basic knowledge of economic notions but were not expert in these top-
ics. Overall, 180 subjects participated and, since each subject only par-
ticipated in one treatment, the number of pairs was 90 in total and 30
per treatment. 98 All interactions between buyers and sellers were
anonymous (i.e., subjects did not know the identity of their trading
partners). Anonymity was preserved to reduce the bias that would
have resulted from subjects making decisions based on friendship or
peer pressure,9 9 on a desire to tease other subjects, 10 0 or to please the
experimenter. 101
Just for their participation in the experiment, all subjects were
entitled to receive a show up fee of $9,000 Colombian Pesos ("COP")
(around $5). 102 An additional fee, contingent on the decisions that each
subject took was capped at $30,000 COP (around $16).103 These
figures are in accordance with other experiments in law and econom-
ics.104 As a rule of thumb, the higher the final price that subjects act-
ing as sellers obtained for their companies or the lower such a price in
the case of buyers, the more the money that they received for their
participation in this experiment.
More particularly, a seller received the minimum additional
payment if the renegotiated price was $1,000 or less and the maximum
payment if the price was $5,000 or more. Conversely, a buyer received
the minimum additional payment ($0) if the price was $5,000 or
higher, and the maximum payment if the price was $1,000 or lower. As
to other prices, payments were calculated at a pro rata basis. The for-
mulas to calculate the exact value of this additional fee appear in Ta-
98 See Croson, supra note 5, at 939-942 (indicating that a rule of thumb is having
between twenty and thirty observations in each treatment).
99 For example, without anonymity, subjects might not want to be regarded too
greedy by their classmates. See id. at 940.
'00 See Antiqueira, Saes, & Lazzarini, supra note 82, at 17.
101 See Jennifer Arlen & Eric L. Talley, Introduction to Experimental Law and
Economics, in EXPERIMENTAL LAw AND ECONOMICS XV (Jennifer Arlen & Eric Tal-
ley eds., 2008); see generally Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining experiments, in HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (in-
dicating that, in comparison with anonymous bargains, there is a lower rate of
disagreements in face-to-face experiments where subjects have more difficulty
controlling preferences or being rude).
102 See Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (Colombian Financial Superin-
tendence), http://www.superfinanciera.gov.co/ (providing exchange rate between
Colombian pesos and U.S. dollars) (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
103 See Croson, supra note 5, at 944 (highlighting that subjects must be paid in
accordance to their choices).
'04 See id. at 943.
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ble 7 (po means the original contract price, and P, means the
renegotiated price). Payments were rounded to the closest thousands
of pesos.
TABLE 7: PAYMENTS IN ADDITION TO THE SHOW UP FEE
Scenario Payment Per Treatment (U.S.$)
The buyer rejected its
seller's first offer 10 5  $0
If p1 - $5000, payment = $0;
w The buyer accepted its if p1 -5 $1000, payment = $30.000;; if $1000 < p, < $5000, payment =seller's first offer~~~~$30.000. P 10 /$4000
The buyer rejected its $seller's first offer $
The buyer accepted its
seller's first offer and, If pi< $5000, payment = $0;
regardless of whether the if p$ < $1000, payment = $30.000;
second offer was accepted, if $1000 < ( <$5000, payment =
the seller did not breach $30.000 * ($5000 - p/$4000
the contract.
The buyer accepted its
seller's first offer, rejected
the second offer and its $0
> seller breached the
106contract.
C. Qualitative Hypotheses (Prediction of Results)
The prediction of the results under standard economic theory
will be made using the method of backward induction. For that pur-
pose, recall that the amount of the unrecoverable losses of a buyer suf-
fering a breach is $2500 in the general treatment, $2000 minus the
contract price in the penalties treatment, and $1000 in the remedies
treatment. Since the amount of unrecoverable losses depends on the
contract price in the penalties treatment, it is necessary to assume a
value for this price before applying the method of backward induction.
Recalling that the seller's costs are $1000 and that the buyer's profit is
$5000 before paying the price of the bauxite, it is assumed for the
three treatments that the parties split the differences and that the
contract price of the bauxite is $3000. In such a case, the profit in all
treatments is $2000 ($5000 - $3000) and the unrecoverable losses in
2015]
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the penalties treatment are -$1000 (that is, the aggrieved buyer ob-
tains a net benefit from breach provided that it successfully collects
the amount of the penalty). An assumption about the likelihood of
breach is also necessary to use the method of backward induction: sup-
pose that the buyer estimates this likelihood in 50%.
Hypothesis 1: There Might Be Differences Among Treatments Regard-
ing the Number of Buyers who Rejects their Seller's First Offers.
Table 8 shows the payoffs for the three treatments using the
method of backward induction.
TABLE 8: BACKWARD INDUCTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER BUYERS
DECIDE TO INVEST
Treatment Decision - State Of Payoff Expected
First Stage Nature: Payoff
2nd Stage
Breach -$2500*50%
General g Performance $2000*50%
No investing $0 $0
Breach $1000*50%Investing _ $1500
Penalties Performance $2000*50%
No investing $0 $0
Breach -$1000*50%
Remedies g Performance $2000*50% 500
No investing $0 $0
As Table 8 indicates, refusing to invest is a better decision for a
buyer in the general treatment (payoff of $0) than investing (expected
payoff of -$1250). Indeed, a buyer in the general treatment would only
invest when the likelihood of breach is estimated at any percentage
below 44.4444%. In that case, the expected payoff resulting from
breach would be $2500*44.44444% = $1111.1111, the same amount
than the expected payoff resulting from performance ($2000*55.5556%
= $1111.1111).
In sheer contrast with the general treatment, investing makes
a buyer better off than refusing to invest in the penalty treatment re-
gardless of the likelihood of breach. After all, and due to the amount of
the penalty, breach generates a net profit for the buyer. Thus, the ex-
pected payoff of investing is $1500 while the payoff of refusing to in-
vest is, of course, $0.
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Finally, and under an assumption of a 50% likelihood of
breach, a buyer is better off investing (expected payoff of $500) than
doing the opposite in the remedies treatment (payoff of $0). This buyer
would only refuse to invest if the likelihood of breach is above
66.6667%. In that case, the expected payoff resulting from breach
would be $1000*66.6667% = $666.6667, the same amount that the ex-
pected payoff resulting from performance ($2000*33.3333%
$666.6667).
Naturally, the predictions indicated above are based on stan-
dard economic theory. Behavioral reasons and notions such as risk
aversion and fairness might alter the decisions of buyers. For instance,
the numbers indicated above suggest that a buyer in the penalty treat-
ment should always invest. Such buyer, however, might be afraid of
not only suffering a breach but also of failing to collect the amount of
the penalty, a situation in which it would suffer an unrecoverable loss.
To avoid this scenario, this buyer might prefer to decline the offer to
enter the contract. Similarly, and even if the method of backward in-
duction suggests that investing is the optimal decision, a buyer in ei-
ther the general or in the remedies treatment might refuse to invest
after considering that the seller's offer is unfair (e.g., above $3000).
Hypothesis 2: There Should Be Differences Among Treatments Re-
garding the Price of the Original Contract
As explained earlier, 10 5 the theory predicts that penalty
clauses and a higher level of legal remedies for breach of contract may
protect investing parties from suffering a hold-up. These contractual
safeguards, however, do not come for free. More particularly, the cost
of these safeguards should be a price increase in the penalties and in
the remedies treatment in comparison with the general treatment. As
to penalties, the seller might only accept to provide a penalty clause in
the contract if the buyer accepts a higher price. Regarding remedies,
the protection comes from the law and not from the contract itself and
the parties cannot change the legal rules (that is, the seller cannot
propose to enter a contract governed by less stringent legal rules on
remedies). Notwithstanding, a higher level of remedies might make a
seller less willing to enter a contract (since it would be more expensive
to get rid of it). As a result, the seller might enter the contract, but
only after requesting a higher price in comparison with a scenario in
which the level of legal remedies is lower.
105 Along this chapter, the pronoun "its" is used to refer to the either buyer or
seller's counterpart taking into account that both parties are companies. Of
course, the pronouns his/her might also be used considering that individuals and
not companies took the decisions during the experimental sessions.
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The difference between the price in either the penalties or the
remedies treatment and the price in the general treatment should be
related to the differences in the amount of damages that the seller
should pay to the buyer in case of breach. These payments are $6500
minus the contract price in the general treatment, $7000 in the penal-
ties treatment, and $8000 minus the contract price in the remedies
treatment. Assuming that the contract price is $3000, the payments,
in the same order, are $3500, $7000, and $5000. It follows that the
price differential when a buyer requests a penalty clause should be
$3500 ($7000 - $3500) and that the same differential when the law
grants a higher level of legal remedies should be $1500 ($5000-
$3500).106
Hypothesis 3: There Should Be Differences Among Treatments Re-
garding the Number of Buyers who Accepted the First Offer and Re-
jected the Second Offer
The theory predicts that both penalty clauses and a higher
level of remedies for breach of contract protect investing parties from
unfavorable renegotiations during the performance stage. 10 7 As a re-
sult, the number of buyers accepting their first seller's offer and re-
jecting the second's should be higher in both the penalties and the
remedies treatments in comparison with the general treatment. Fur-
thermore, and since the penalty clause seems a better protection
against an extorted modification than the higher level of remedies (re-
call that under the penalty treatment the breach entails a net benefit
for an aggrieved buyer), the number of buyers accepting their first
seller's offer and rejecting the second's in the penalty treatment should
be higher than in the remedies treatment.
Hypothesis 4: There Should Be Differences Among Treatments as to
the Price that Triggers the Rejection in the Second Stage
For the reasons indicated in the explanation of the third hy-
pothesis, a buyer in the general treatment would only reject the de-
mand for a renegotiation under threat to breach at a price higher than
a buyer in the remedies treatment. Similarly, a buyer in the remedies
treatment would only reject such a demand at a price higher than a
buyer in the penalties treatment. After all, penalties, and a higher
level of remedies to a lower extent, should increase the incentives that
106 As mentioned earlier, sellers did not breach the contracts because it was ineffi-
cient. Buyers, however, did not know that and were informed that if that breach
occurred, their additional payment would be zero. This reflects the information
asymmetries during the experiment.
107 See supra § III.
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an investing party has to reject a demand for a modification or, in
other words, to be less afraid of a breach if the threat is carried out.
Hypothesis 5: There Should Be Differences Among Treatments Re-
garding the Prices that Sellers Offers in the Second Stage and that
Their Buyers Accepts
For the same reasons indicated in the explanation of the third
and the fourth hypotheses, there should be differences among the
three treatments regarding not only the renegotiated prices, but also
the gaps between these renegotiated prices and the original offers.
Thus, the lowest average renegotiated price should appear in the gen-
eral treatment, which does not include any protection against the hold-
up problem. In turn, the average renegotiated price in the remedies
treatment should be higher than the same price in the general treat-
ment but lower than in the penalties treatment.
Hypothesis 6: There Should not Be Differences Among Treatments Re-
garding the Sellers' False Claims About the Thirdco's Offer for the
Bauxite
Although estimating in advance the seller's false claim about
the Thirdco's offer for the bauxite is very difficult, some comments are
possible. First, there should not be differences (at least significant)
among treatments. Second, the higher the original seller's offer, the
higher the false Thirdco's offer. After all, Thirdco's offer should be
higher than the original price to increase the likelihood of the buyer
accepting the price increase. Third, Thirdco's offer should be lower
than the seller's second offer. Otherwise, the buyer would anticipate
that the claim is false since it would be better for the seller to deliver
the bauxite to Thirdco and not to this buyer.
V. RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT
1. There Are Not Significant Differences Among Treatments
Regarding the Number of Buyers who Rejected their
Sellers' First Offers
Table 9 summarizes the information of pairs who did not reach
the second stage.
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TABLE 9: NUMBER OF BUYERS REJECTING THEIR SELLERS'
FIRST OFFERS
Buyers Rejecting Seller's Offer
Treatment The First Offer (Average)
General 4 $2,963
Penalty Clauses 6 $2,183
Legal Remedies 5 $2,620
Average 5 $2,537
Standard Deviation 1 $994
Pairs Reaching Second Stage 75 $1,923
Recall that Selco's total costs of extracting and delivering the
bauxite were $1,000 while Buyco's profit was $5,000 minus the con-
tract price. Thus, sellers should have proposed prices between $1,000
and $5,000 and buyer should have accepted these offers provided that
they believed that either an unfavorable price renegotiation or a
breach were unlikely. In accordance with the first part of this forecast
and save two participants who offered prices below $1,000,08 all sell-
ers offered prices higher than $1,000 and lower than $5,000 (indeed,
the lowest price was $1,000 and the highest was $4,750). In contrast
with the second part of the theoretical prediction, however, some buy-
ers did not accept their sellers' first offers in spite of them being lower
than $5,000. On the other hand, while the number of buyers rejecting
their sellers' first offers differs among treatments, such differences are
negligible. In more statistical terms, these small differences combined
with the also small number of observations does not allow for rejecting
the hypothesis stating that the number of acceptance of original offers
varied significantly within treatments.
Since it was efficient to enter the contract in the first stage,
behavioral and economic reasons must explain why fifteen out of
ninety buyers rejected their seller's first offers. Some behavioral rea-
sons might have been either a misunderstanding of the hypothetical
case or a feeling that the offer was too high and, therefore, unfair."0 9
The economic reasons, in turn, are more related to the hold-up prob-
lem and, more particularly, linked to beliefs about the possibility of an
unfavorable price renegotiation or breach during the second stage. Af-
ter all, some participants might have concluded that entering the con-
tract and therefore, making an investment whose profitability
depended on the prompt delivery of the bauxite for a seller without
competitors in the area triggered a too high risk that was not commen-
surate with the offer, especially taking into account the likelihood of
108 Again, behavioral reasons might generate some deviations from these
predictions.109 See supra § III.
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breach resulting from a third-party offering a higher amount for the
bauxite at a larger stage.
Some qualitative evidence from the experiment supports this
statement. Buyers who did not reach an agreement in the first stage
explained why they rejected their sellers' offers. Most answers were
quite simple, just stating that the offer was too high. Other answers,
however, are quite revealing. One buyer of the general treatment and
another from the remedies treatment, for instance, rejected their of-
fers because the profit was too low for too risky a business. A third
buyer, in the penalty treatment, stated that the offer was too high for a
seller lacking any other buyer to purchase the bauxite at a price above
its costs. The other two buyers, both in the remedies treatment,
claimed that the profit resulting from their sellers' offers was not
enough taking into account the investment necessary to manufacture
customized aluminum. In short, all these buyers, while presumably ar-
riving to the experiment without knowing anything about the hold-up
problem, understood the risks of suffering breach due to a third-party
making a better offer for a bauxite and of making an investment neces-
sary to sell customized aluminum for a customer downstream whose
profitability depended on the seller of the bauxite timely honoring its
promise. Put it another way, such buyers were not willing to accept
their sellers' offers unless the prices incorporated the contract risks
through a downwards adjustment.
Admittedly, the reluctance to enter the contract should have
been ameliorated in both the penalties and the remedies treatment in
comparison with the general treatment. After all, both penalties and a
higher level of remedies for breach of contract increase the protection
against a buyer who might be held-up by its seller. The results, how-
ever, do not indicate major differences between the willingness to
enter the contract in the general treatment, on the one hand, and in
either the penalties or the remedies treatment, on the other hand. As a
result, the data does not allow for concluding that either penalties or a
higher level of remedies reduce the under-investment effect of the
hold-up problem.
Nevertheless, as Table 9 indicates, some differences do exist
among treatments regarding the threshold from which buyers are no
longer willing to accept their sellers' offers. Indeed, such threshold is
lower in the remedies treatment ($2,620) in comparison with the gen-
eral treatment ($2,963) and it is reduced even further in the penalties
treatment ($2,183). Therefore, at first sight, penalties, and also reme-
dies to a lower extent, reduce the price that the investing party toler-
ates during the contract negotiation and that the non-investing party
may obtain if it intends to reach an agreement with its buyer. The
differences, however, are not statistically significant at the 10% level
since the P(T<=t)] value is 0.2273 when the general and the penalties
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treatment are compared (the t stat and the degrees of freedom - here-
inafter DF - are, respectively, 1.3078 and 8), and 0.6875 when the gen-
eral and the remedies treatments are compared (t stat=0.4194, and
DF=7).
2. There Are Descriptive but not Significant Differences Among
Treatments Regarding the Price of the Original Contract
Original prices vary among treatments for 75 of the 90 partici-
pant pairs in the experiment. Table 10 reflects these prices.
TABLE 10: ORIGINAL PRICES FOR PAIRS REACHING THE SECOND STAGE
Buyers Accepting Original Seller's Offer
Treatment the Original Offer (Average)
General 26 $2077
Penalty Clauses 24 $1778
Legal Remedies 25 $1901
Average 25 $1923
Standard Deviation $785
At first sight, these numbers suggest that both penalty clauses
and a higher level of legal remedies for breach of contract, to a lower
extent, have a downward effect on the original seller's offer. More pre-
cisely, the difference between the sellers' first offers in the general and
in the penalty treatments is 14.3958% while the difference between
these offers in the general and in the remedies treatments is 8.4738%.
Undeniably, these are not big percentages but neither are negligible
amounts, especially when the contract price is in the nine-digits as
usually happen in complex contracts leading .to hold-up situations.
Since the theory dictates that a rational seller usually accepts
a penalty clause in exchange for a premium, it is surprising that the
original prices in the penalty treatment were lower than in the general
one. A similar statement may be made in respect of the remedies treat-
ment. A more formal statistical analysis, however, does not allow for
categorically concluding that either penalties or a high level of reme-
dies push downwards the original offer that a seller makes to its
buyer. On the one hand, a t test does not allow for rejecting the equal-
ity of prices in the general and in the penalty treatments. To be sure,
the results are not conclusive taking into account, as Table 11 indi-
cates, that the P(T<=t)] value is 0.1039, a figure slightly higher than
the figure required to reject the hypothesis of equality of prices when
the significance level is relaxed to ten-percent.
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TABLE 11: TESTING THE EQUALITY OF PRICES IN GENERAL AND IN THE
PENALTIES TREATMENT
t - Test Values
DF 48
t Stat 1.6575
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1039
t Critical two-tail 2.0106
In respect of remedies, the results are much clearer. A t test
does not allow for rejecting the equality of prices in the general and in
the remedies treatments, as Table 12 shows.
TABLE 12: TESTING THE EQUALITY OF PRICES IN GENERAL AND IN THE
PENALTIES TREATMENT
t - Test Values
DF 49
t Stat 0.9519
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3458
t Critical two-tail 2.0096
3. There Are Not Significant Differences Among Treatments
Regarding the Numbers of Buyers who Accepted the First
Offer and Rejected the Second Offer
Recalling that sellers' threats to breach were empty ones, an
extorted renegotiation occurred whenever a buyer accepted both its
seller's first and second offers. In principle, this event should be less
frequent both in the penalties and in the remedies treatments than in
the general one. In the experiment, however, no significant differences
among treatments aroused, as Table 13 shows.
TABLE 13: BUYERS ACCEPTING THEIR SELLERS' FIRST OFFER AND
REJECTING THE SECOND ONE 1 1 0
Buyers Original Final
Total Pairs Rejecting Seller's Seller's
- Second Second Offer Offer
Treatment Stage Offer (Average) (Average) Difference
General 26 5.0 (19%) $2660 $4050 $1390
Penalty Clauses 24 5.0 (21%) $2020 $3500 $1480
Legal Remedies 25 7.0 (28%) $2084 $3029 $944
Average 25 5.7 (23%) $2235 $3468 $1233
Standard Deviation 1.2 $722 $767 $705
110 One seller offered a price of $800 and another a price of $780. Of course, their
buyers accepted these offers and, less predictably, the sellers offered a new price
20151
36 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:1
The percentage of buyers rejecting the seller's second offer in
the penalty treatment and both the percentage and the number of buy-
ers doing the same in the remedies treatment are higher than the
figures in the general treatment. Nonetheless, the low number of pairs
rejecting the second offer and, more noticeably, the small differences
among treatments does not allow for concluding that either penalty
clauses or a high level of remedies increase the protection to held-up
buyers. To be sure, the data do not support either the opposite conclu-
sion, that is, that penalty clauses and a high level of legal remedies are
not useful to prevent the hold-up problem or, more particularly, to re-
duce the likelihood of rejecting a demand for a modification backed by
an empty threat to breach. That the data is inconclusive might be due
to a small sample size.
4. There Are Descriptive but not Significant Differences Among
Treatments as to the Price that Triggered the Rejection in
the Second Stage
As Table 13 indicates, the average price at which a seller's offer
in the second stage is rejected is lower in the penalties treatment
($3,500) than in the general treatment ($4,050) and it is reduced even
further in the remedies treatment ($3,029). Thus, other things being
constant, either the contract providing a penalty clause or the law in-
creasing the level of remedies for breach of contract seems to reduce
the maximum price at which a held-up buyer is willing to accept an
extorted renegotiation. These results are in sync with the theoretical
predictions."'
A t test fails to confirm this finding in respect of penalty
clauses but do so as to legal remedies. On the one hand, the t test does
not allow for rejecting the hypothesis of equality of prices in the sellers'
second offers that their buyers rejected when the general and the pen-
alties treatment are compared (P(T<=t) value = 0.27; t stat=1.1820,
and DF=8). On the other hand, a t test rejects the equality of sellers'
second offers when the general and remedies treatment are compared
provided that the significance level is greater than two percent; that is,
during the second stage, which was higher but still lower than the cost of
extracting the bauxite ($880 and $810). Perhaps, these participants did not
understand the instructions or the figures of the hypothetical case well. An
alternative explanation is also plausible: these sellers did not misunderstand the
instructions but were just very risk-averse taking into account that other buyers of
bauxite were only willing to pay $500 for this mineral (that is, they were not
making any profit but, at least, reducing the losses).
111 Nonetheless, this reason does not seem very plausible considering that the effi-
cient range of prices was between $1,000 and $5,000 and that the average price of
rejected offers was, for all treatments, below the median of this range ($3,000),
which may have signaled a fair distribution of the profits.
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the hypothesis cannot be rejected if the significance level is, say, one
percent (P(T<=t) value = 0.0155); t stat=2.9137, and DF=10).
The empirical confirmation of the theory predicting that a
higher level of legal remedies for breach of contract mitigates extorted
modifications by reducing the renegotiated price is good news for the
prevention of hold-ups. This tandem of experimental results and theo-
retical predictions indicates that there is at least one strategy to battle
the hold-up problem with good chances of obtaining a favorable
outcome.
Unfortunately, the fact that the number of seller's offers which
were rejected during the first stage did not significantly vary among
treatments do not allow to conclude that the hold-up problem (that is,
the issue of underinvestment) is also prevented. Furthermore, the low
number of observations suggests caution before jumping to general
conclusions unless larger samples are analyzed. This article, however,
speculates that the results obtained in this experiment regarding rene-
gotiated prices in the remedies treatment will be replicated in other
similar experiments.
5. There Are Descriptive but not Significant Differences Among
Treatments Regarding the Prices that Sellers Offered in the
Second Stage and that Their Buyers Accepted
The theory predicts that the renegotiated price should be lower
in both the penalty and the remedies treatment than in the general
treatment. 1 12 On first impression, the experimental data confirm this
finding in respect of penalty clauses but not regarding legal remedies.
Table 14 summarizes the results.
TABLE 14: PRICES OFFERED AND ACCEPTED DURING THE
SECOND STAGE
Buyers Original Final Seller's
Accepting Seller's Offer Offer
Treatment Second Offer (Average) (Average) Difference
General 21.0 $1939 $2507 $569
Penalty Clauses 19.0 $1814 $2302 $588
Legal Remedies 18.0 $1830 $2542 $713
Average 19.3 $1831 $2451 $620
Standard Deviation (Price) $590 $820 $564
On the one hand, the difference between the final price in the
general and in the penalty treatments is 8.1771%. While not in the
double digits, this percentage may mitigate the hold-up problem by re-
112 The data in the third and fourth columns of this table considers only the subset
of buyers who accepted the first sellers' offer and rejected the second one.
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ducing the renegotiated price. Unfortunately for the role of penalty
clauses on the prevention of the hold-up problem, a t test does not al-
low for rejecting the hypothesis of equality of prices in the general and
the penalties treatment (P(T<=t) value is 0.3743, t stat=0.8990, and
DF=38).
On the other hand, the renegotiated price is slightly higher in
the remedies treatment than in the general one (the difference is
1.3961%). At first glance, this difference might suggest that remedies
would not only fail to prevent the hold-up problem but would also ag-
gravate it. The difference, however, is not robust from a statistical
standpoint since a t test does not allow for rejecting the hypothesis of
similarity between the sellers' offers in the general treatments and in
the remedies treatment (P(T<=t) = 0.8977, t stat=-0.1294, and DF=37).
As a final note, two out of the seventy-five sellers reaching the
second stage (one in the penalty and another one in the remedies
treatment) offered the same original price. While they did not explain
the reasons to relinquish the opportunity to obtain a higher price (to be
sure, the forms did not inquired them about that), moral considera-
tions might have motivated such decisions. In accordance with the
principle pacta sunt servanda, deeply ingrained in civil law countries,
these two participants might have regarded as unfair modifying a
price that had been freely agreed some minutes before. Indeed, one of
these two participants orally confirmed this reasoning. In words of this
participant, the promise made in the first stage was sacred and there-
fore, only a mean seller would have asked for a price increase.
6. There Were Descriptive but not Significant Differences Among
Treatments Regarding the Seller's False Claim About the
Thirdco's Offer for the Bauxite
Recall that sellers were allowed to falsely claim that a third-
company increased its offer to buy bauxite from $500 to a higher
amount while buyers were unable to check whether or not this state-
ment was true. Table 15 shows the false third-party offers for all pairs
who reached the second stage.
TABLE 15: FALSE THIRD-PARTY OFFERS FOR PAIRS REACHING THE
SECOND STAGE
Third-Party's Seller's Final Difference (D =
Treatment Pairs Offer (A) Offer (B) B - A)
General 26 $2673 $2804 $131
Penalty Clauses 24 $2554 $2551 -$3
Legal Remedies 25 $2662 $2678 $16
Average 25 $2631 $2681 $50
Standard Deviation 1 $1083 $910 $604
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The false third-party's average offer in the penalty clause is
slightly lower than in the general treatment (the difference is
4.4519%). The gap between this average offhr in the general and in the
remedies treatments, in turn, is negligible (the difference is 0.4115%).
Both differences are not only very small but also, and not surprisingly,
statistically irrelevant since the P(T<=t)] value when the general and
the penalties treatment are compared is 0.7088 (t stat=0.3757, and
DF=48), and the same value, when the comparison is between the
general and the remedies treatment, is 0.9699 (t stat=0.0380, and
DF=49).
On the other hand, the sellers' average final offer is slightly
higher than the false third-party's offers (the difference is 1.9004%).
Indeed, the seller's offers and the third-party's false offers are so simi-
lar that their correlation coefficient is not far from the unit (it is
0.8299). These small differences between these two ranges of prices
might indicate a subtle message from the sellers to their buyers, some-
thing like the following one: "I received this offer from the third-party
but will prefer to keep selling the bauxite to you and, therefore, will
turn such offer down if you pay just a little more than that."
7. Some Behavioral Reasons May Have Affected the Results
While behavioral law and economics is beyond the scope of
thisarticle, some discussion about the effect of reputational and moral
considerations is warranted. Recall that only fifteen out of ninety pairs
failed to enter a contract. Furthermore, seventeen out of the seventy-
five buyers who reached the second stage rejected their sellers' de-
mand for a price increase; in other words, these buyers were not held-
up by their sellers. As to the remaining fifty-eight pairs, the difference
between the average final price ($2,451) and the average original price
($1,831) was only $620 (33.8613%), a no negligible figure but not a
number as high as might have been theoretically expected. In sum, the
hold-up problem seems to have been less frequent and harmful in the
experiment than in the theoretical predictions.
Sellers might have refrained from more aggressive demands
and buyers might have been willing to invest in the first stage and,
some of them, to reject the renegotiations demands in the second stage
for a variety of behavioral reasons. To begin with, while neither sellers
nor buyers knew the identity of their pairs, all of them knew that its
counterpart was an individual participant in the same session and,
therefore, a classmate and possibly a friend. This feature of the experi-
ment might have refrained sellers from behaving more aggressively.
Similar to what happened in this controlled scenario, friendship ties
among business people or even courtesy may increase trust in the real
business world and, as a result, act as a check against opportunistic in
most cases.
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As a second reason, people both in experiments and in real bus-
iness life might refrain from taking advantage of hold-up opportunities
on moral grounds. Recall the two participants refusing to demand a
higher price during the experimental sessions claiming that it would
have been morally wrong. These, however, might have not been the
only examples of moral restraint. Other sellers might have decided to
demand a low price increase instead of a higher differential based on
moral considerations. Thus, the rationale of these sellers might have
been along the following lines: "It is immoral to ask for a too high price
increase but maybe not wrong to demand a moderate contract change."
Of course, the experiment was not designed to verify this rationale
and, therefore, other studies will be necessary to either confirm or re-
ject such assumption.
If the hold-up problem was not as frequent and harmful in the
experiment as theoretically expected, its significance might be even
lower in the real business life. The experiment simulated a one-shot
contract; after all, the hypothetical scenario did not mention any other
future business between the parties or between the seller and other
companies. Therefore, participants acting as sellers should not have
been very concerned about reputational consequences of their opportu-
nistic behavior or, more particularly, about losing future contracts
with the same or with third parties due to their conduct. In real life, by
contrast, the prospect of losing future ventures due to a stained repu-
tation resulting from holding-up business partners might be a check
against demanding price modifications backed by a threat of breach.
On balance, this articlespeculates that although opportunities
for a party holding-up its business partners may arise frequently, only
a few percentage of these companies take advantage of these chances
to behave opportunistically due to moral and reputational reasons. 11 3
To be sure, this is just a theoretically assumption which, as any the-
ory, needs to be empirically tested. Sadly, these empirical studies are
not an easy task. The fact that hold-up situations might arise in prac-
tice with less frequency than expected in theory make it difficult to
empirically study the hold-up problem except with unusually large
numbers. 1 1 4
8. Summary of the Results
For the sake of clarity and taking into account that the analy-
sis was divided in several categories, each of them leading to different
conclusions (indeed, some of them not leading to strong conclusions),
Table 16 summarizes the results. In this table, GT means the General
113 See supra §III.
114 See supra § III.
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Treatment, PT means the Penalty Treatment, and RT means the Rem-
edy Treatment.
TABLE 16: SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
Significant Significant
Differences Based Differences Differences
on Descriptive Between GT and Between GT and
Item Statistics PT RT
Numbers of buyers Negligible Not applicable 1 1 5  Not applicable
rejecting the first
offer
Average price that Yes ($2963 in GT, No. P(T<=t) =0.2273 No. P(T<=t) =0.6875
sellers offered and $2183 in PT, and
that buyers rejected $2620 in RT)
in the first stage
Average price that Yes ($2077 in GT, Yes, provided that No. P(T<=t) = 0.3458
sellers offered and $1778 in PT, and the significance level
that buyers accepted $1901 in RT) is slightly lower than
in the first stage 10%. P(T<=t) =
0.1039
Number of buyers Negligible Not applicable Not applicable
that accepted the
first offer and
rejected the second
one
Average price that Yes ($2507 in GT, No. P(T<=t) =0.3743. No. P(T<=t) =0.8977
sellers offered and $2302 in PT, and
that buyers accepted $2542 in RT)
in the second stage
Average price that Yes ($4050 in GT, No. P(T<=t) =0.2711 Yes. P(T<=t) =0.0155
sellers offered and $3500 in PT, and
that buyers rejected $3029 in RT)
in the second stage
Average price that Yes ($2673 in GT, No. P(T<=t) =0.7018 No. P(T<=t) =0.9699
sellers falsely claimed $2554 in PT, and
the third-party $2662 in RT)
offered in the second
stage
115 An example might have been the famous vertical integration between Fisher
Body and General Motors. Presumably, General Motors, manufacturer of
automobiles, bought a significant percentage of shares of Fisher Body, a supplier
of car bodies, to avoid being held-up by this company. See K Benjamin Klein, Why
Hold-Ups Occur: The Self Enforcing Range of Contractual Relations, 34 EcoN.
INQUIRY 444, 461 (1996). But perhaps, and according to Nobel Laureate Ronald H.
Coase's version of the story, a hold-up never occurred (even though an opportunity
for it existed) and the vertical integration was based on other grounds (such as
achieving economics of scale). See Ronald H. Coase, The Conduct of Economics:
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CONCLUSION
This experiment leads to some particular and general conclu-
sions. As to the particular conclusions, neither penalty clauses nor
remedies seem to clearly affect the willingness to invest in the first
stage (that is, to enter the contract). Furthermore, the few number of
observations and the small differences among treatments make un-
clear whether these contractual and legal devices increase the likeli-
hood of the held-up party rejecting an extorted modification backed up
by an empty threat to breach.
On the other hand, and from a descriptive statistics stand-
point, both penalty clauses and remedies not only pushed downwards
the original prices (in comparison with the general treatment), but
also the sellers' false claims about the third-party's offers and, more
importantly, the sellers' final offers, both when the buyers accepted
and rejected them.'1 ' These results suggest that both penalty clauses
and a higher level of remedies, by reducing the amount of the extorted
price, mitigate the hold-up problem (or, at least, make it less ruinous
for held-up buyers). The price differences among treatments, however,
are not statistically significant according to the t tests run with the
only exception of the prices that sellers offered and buyers rejected in
the remedies treatment.
In any event, that the statistical tests did not allow for re-
jecting the hypotheses of similarity among prices in most cases do not
entail that the role of both penalties and remedies on the prevention of
the hold-up problem is null. These tests, to be clear, just suggest that
the data is not enough to reach strong conclusions. In other words, the
data did not prove the theoretical predictions but neither disproved
them and, therefore, more experiments are necessary to confirm or re-
ject the preliminary results obtained here.
In light of the above, and until other experiments indicate oth-
erwise, the theoretical predictions stating that penalties and a higher
level of remedies mitigate the hold-up problem remain valid. As a re-
sult, courts err when they fail to understand the role of penalty clauses
on the prevention of extorted modifications and mistakenly reduce
their amount in hindsight under the view that it is too high in compar-
ison with the actual damages. Courts might also err when they in-
crease the undercompensatory nature of legal remedies in the context
The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
255, 262, 264, 266, 269 (2006) [hereinafter Coase (Conduct)].
116 See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific In-
vestments: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 MIcH. L. REV.
2636, 2641-42, 2665-67 (2000) (arguing that the theory about the role of relation-
ship-specific investments in the structure of firms is more tenuous that it had been
assumed).
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of complex contracts requiring idiosyncratic investments by requiring
a too-high standard of evidence in respect of some kind of damages,
such as future losses.
Regarding the general conclusions, this article hopes to have
opened the gates for a series of empirical analyses in the realm of con-
tract law and, more particularly, in the field of hold-up situations.
Such experiments might study either theories similar to the ones
tested here or other hypothesis, such as the-role of the rules on good-
faith modifications and of economic duress on the prevention of the
hold-up problem, just to give two examples. Experiments might also
test theories related to the hold-up problem in contracts other than
sale of goods (e.g., franchise contracts).
